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Abstract— Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) techniques
allow for multiplexing and/or diversity gain, and will be widely
deployed in future wireless systems. In this paper, we propose a
MIMO-assisted channel-based authentication scheme, exploiting
current channel estimation mechanisms in MIMO systems to
detect spoofing attacks with very low overhead. In this scheme,
the use of multiple antennas provides extra dimensions of channel
estimation data, and thus leads to a “security gain” over single-
input single-output (SISO) systems. We investigate the security
gain of MIMO systems in several system configurations via
simulations for a specific real indoor environment using ray-
tracing software. We also discuss the effect of increasing the
number of transmit and receive antennas on the security gain
and contrast that to the diversity/multiplexing gain.
Index Terms— MIMO, channel-based authentication, spoofing
attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have become pervasive and essential,
but most wireless systems lack the ability to reliably identify
clients without employing complicated cryptographic tools.
This problem introduces a significant threat to the security
of wireless networks, since intruders can access wireless net-
works without a physical connection. One serious consequence
is that spoofing attacks (or masquerading attacks), where a
malicious device claims to be a specific client by spoofing
its MAC address, becomes possible. Spoofing attacks can
seriously degrade network performance and facilitate many
forms of security weakness, for instance, if attacking control
messages/ management frames smartly, the intruder can cor-
rupt services of legal clients [1]–[3].
It is desirable to conduct authentication at the lowest pos-
sible layer, and thus a channel-based authentication approach
was proposed in [4], exploiting the fact that, in rich multipath
environments typical of wireless scenarios, channel responses
are location-specific. More specifically, channel frequency re-
sponses decorrelate from one transmit-receive path to another,
if the paths are separated by the order of an RF wavelength or
more [5]. Channel-based authentication is able to discriminate
among transmitters with low system overhead, since it utilizes
existing channel estimation mechanisms.
This prior work [4] on physical layer authentication has
focused on single antenna systems. However, with the ability
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to provide diversity gain and/or multiplexing gain, multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) techniques will be widely de-
ployed in future wireless networks, e.g. IEEE 802.11 n, to
improve traffic capacity and link quality [6]. Therefore, in this
paper, we extend the analysis of channel-based authentication
to MIMO systems, and investigate the impact of MIMO
techniques on the performance of spoofing detection.
We note that the channel-based authentication is used to
discriminate among different transmitters, and must be com-
bined with a traditional handshake authentication process to
completely identify an entity. We assume that an entity’s
identity is obtained at the beginning of a transmission using
traditional higher layer authentication mechanisms. Channel-
based authentication is then used to ensure that all signals in
both the handshake process and data transmission are actually
from the same transmitter. Thus this may be viewed as a cross-
layer design approach to authentication.
We begin the paper by describing the system model in
Section II, including the attack model and channel estimation.
Then we present our MIMO-assisted channel-based authen-
tication scheme in Section III. In Section IV, we describe
the simulation approach and present simulation results. We
conclude in Section V with a discussion of the effect of MIMO
transmission parameters on the authentication performance.
We also contrast the diversity/multiplexing gains with the
security gain.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Attack Model
Throughout the discussion, we introduce three different
parties: Alice, Bob and Eve. As shown in Fig. 1, they are
assumed to be located in spatially separated positions. Alice
is the legal client with NT antennas, initiating communication
by sending signals to Bob. As the intended receiver, Bob is
the legal access point (AP) with NR antennas. Their nefarious
adversary, Eve, will inject undesirable communications into
the medium with NE antennas, in the hopes of impersonating
Alice.
In order to obtain the multiplexing gain associated with
multiple antennas, the channel state information must be
known at receivers [7]. Thus we assume that legal transmitters
send non-overlapping pilots from NT antennas, and Bob uses
it to estimate channel responses, for non-security purposes. In
the authentication process, Bob tracks the channel responses
to discriminate between legitimate signals from Alice and
illegitimate signals from Eve.
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Fig. 1. The adversarial multipath environment involving multiple scattering
surfaces. The transmission from Alice with NT antennas to Bob with NR
antennas, experiences different multipath effects than the transmission by the
adversary, Eve. Bob uses pilot symbols to estimate channel responses from
the transmitters, and thus discriminate between Alice and Eve.
B. Channel Estimation Model
A legal transmission from Alice to Bob in Fig. 1 will
involve a MIMO system with NT transmit (Tx) antennas and
NR receive (Rx) antennas. Bob measures and stores channel
frequency response samples at M tones, across an overall
system bandwidth of W , where each subband has bandwidth
b (≤W/M ), and the center frequency of the system is f0.
We consider channel frequency responses for two frames,
which may or may not come from the same transmitter, and
denote them by
Hi = [Hi(1, 1), Hi(1, 2), · · · , Hi(NT , NR)]
T
, i = 1, 2,
(1)
where Hi(jt, jr) = [Hi,1(jt, jr), · · · , Hi,M (jt, jr)]T , 1 ≤
jt ≤ NT , 1 ≤ jr ≤ NR, and Hi,m(jt, jr) = Hi(jt, jr, fo +
W (m/M − 0.5)) is the channel response at the m-th tone in
the i-th frame, connecting the jt-th Tx antenna and jr-th Rx
antenna. The NTNRM elements in Hi are independent and
identically distributed.
In a real receiver, the phase of the local oscillator changes
with time, leading to a phase measurement rotation of the
underlying channel responses. The phase shifts are the same
in channel estimations of NR antennas, since the antennas
are connected to the same receiver oscillator. Considering
the phase rotation and receiver thermal noise, we model the
estimated channel frequency response as
Hˆi = Hie
jφi +Ni, (2)
where φi ∈ [0, 2pi) denotes the unknown phase measurement
rotation, and Ni is the receiver thermal noise vector with
NTNRM elements, which are independent and identically
distributed complex Gaussian random variables, CN(0, σ2).
The noise variance, σ2, is defined as the receiver noise
power per tone, PN = κTNF b, divided by the transmit power
per tone per transmit antenna, PT /NT , i.e.,
σ2 =
NTPN
PT
=
NTκTNF b
PT
, (3)
where PT is the transmit power per tone, κT is the thermal
noise density in mW/Hz, NF is the receiver noise figure, and
b is the measurement noise bandwidth per tone (equals to the
subband bandwidth). The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in the
channel estimation per tone is defined as
SNR =
PTE[||Hi||2F ]
PNN2TNRM
, (4)
where the expected value is taken over all the channel realiza-
tions at locations of interests, and ||A||F denotes the Frobenius
norm of the matrix A.
III. MIMO-ASSISTED AUTHENTICATION
MIMO-assisted channel-based authentication compares
channel frequency responses at consecutive frames. Assuming
stationary terminals and time-invariant channels, we should
report spoofing attacks if channel responses from the same
user are significantly different in two frames.
MIMO techniques introduce an extra benefit to spoofing
detection. Considering the Alice-Bob-Eve attack model in Fig.
1, if Eve does not know the number of transmit antennas
at Alice, NT , she has to predict NT . If Eve has the wrong
prediction, or she simply does not have NT antennas, Bob
will foil her with certainty, based on the messed up channel
estimation and data decoding results. In other words, Eve has
a chance of fooling Bob only if she knows NT and uses
NT transmit antennas, as is our assumption in the following
discussions.
A. Hypothesis Testing
Assuming Bob obtains channel responses of Hˆ1 and Hˆ2,
respectively, for two frames with the same identity, we build a
simple hypothesis test for the purpose of transmitter discrim-
ination. In the null hypothesis, H0, two estimates are from
the same terminal, and thus the claimant is the legal user.
Otherwise, Bob accepts the alternative hypothesis, H1, and
claims that a spoofing attack has occurred, i.e., the claimant
terminal is no longer the previous one:
H0 : H1 = H2 (5)
H1 : H1 6= H2. (6)
Since both φ1 and φ2 are unknown, Bob chooses the pair-
wise test statistic as
L =
1
σ2
||Hˆ1 − Hˆ2ejφ||2, (7)
where
φ = argmin
x
||Hˆ1 − Hˆ2ejx|| = Arg(Hˆ1Hˆ
H
2 ). (8)
In the high SNR region, where the proposed scheme must
perform, it is easy to show that, under H0, we have
LH0 ≈
1
σ2
||N1 − N2||2 ∼ χ2S , (9)
indicating that L is approximately a Chi-square variable with
S = 2NTNRM degrees of freedom. Otherwise, when H1 is
true, L is a non-central Chi-square variable, given by
LH1 ≈
1
σ2
||H1 −H2ejφ + N1 − N2||2 ∼ χ2S,µ, (10)
3where the non-centrality parameter, µ, is written as
µ =
PT
PNNT
||H1 −H2ejArg(H1H
H
2
)||2. (11)
For fixed PT , the dimension of Hi is proportional to MNR,
and thus µ rises with both NR and M . On the other hand,
the impact of NT is more complex, depending on the specific
value of H1, H2, and PT .
The rejection region of H0 is defined as L ≤ k, where
k is the test threshold, which is selected according to an
appropriate performance target.
B. Performance Criteria
Given a building environment and terminal locations, we
derive the performance of MIMO-based spoofing detection,
averaged over all realizations of receiver thermal noise. From
Eq. (9), we can write the “false alarm rate” (or Type I error)
for a given k as
α = Pr(L > k|H0) = 1− Fχ2S (k), (12)
where FX(·) is the CDF of the random variable X . Similarly,
from Eq. (10), the “miss detection rate” (or Type II error) for
given k is given by
β = Pr(L ≤ k|H1) = Fχ2S,µ(k), (13)
indicating that α rises with k, while β decreases with it. By
Eq. (12) and (13), we have the miss rate for given false alarm
rate as
β(α) = Fχ2
S,µ
(F−1
χ2
S
(1− α)), (14)
where F−1X (·) is the inverse function of FX(·). From Eq. (11)
and (14), we see the miss rate decreases with PT , since higher
transmit power allows for more accurate channel estimation.
We will investigate the security gain of MIMO techniques
in our channel-based authentication scheme. For given α, it
is defined as the relative decrease of β(α), if replacing single
antenna systems with multiple antenna systems, i.e.,
G =
βSISO(α) − βMIMO(α)
βMIMO(α)
, (15)
where βSISO and βMIMO are the miss rates in the single
antenna systems and multiple antenna systems, respectively.
C. Performance Discussion
The use of multiple antennas has a two-fold impact: it
improves security performance by increasing the frequency
sample size from 2M to 2MNTNR. On the other hand, the
use of multiple transmit antennas reduces the transmit power
per antenna, leading to performance loss of some degree.
Note that the frequency sample size, M ∈ [1,Ms], is
selected for security purposes, where Ms (≥ M ), the total
number of subbands, is determined by non-security issues such
as data decoding accuracy. The average transmit power per
tone is determined by Ms, with PT = Ptotal/Ms, where Ptotal
is the total system transmit power. Hence, PT is independent
of any other parameters mentioned, and we assume constant
PT in the comparison of system configurations.
In wideband systems, b is fixed and the detection perfor-
mance improves with W , since channel responses decorrelate
more rapidly in space with higher system bandwidth. From
(3), (11), and (14), we see that β increases with b, since the
power of measurement noise is proportional to b. As will be
shown later, the optimal choice for wideband systems is to set
M = Ms.
In narrowband systems, however, since W < Bc, where
Bc is the channel coherence bandwidth, we set M = 1 and
W = b. As a result, the detection performance improves as
system bandwidth W = b decreases, as can be inferred from
Eq. (3), (11), and (14).
IV. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Simulation Method
The WiSE tool, a ray-tracing software package developed by
Bell Laboratories [8], was used to model not only typical chan-
nel responses, but the spatial variability of these responses.
One input to WiSE is the 3-dimensional plan of a specific
building, including walls, floors, ceilings and their material
properties (e.g., dielectric coefficient and conductivity). With
this information, WiSE calculates the rays at any receiver from
any transmitter, including their amplitudes, phases and delays.
From this, it is straightforward to construct the transmit-
receive frequency response over any specified interval.
We have done this for a typical office building, for which
a top view of the first floor is shown in Fig. 2. This floor
of this building is 120 meters long, 14 meters wide and 4
meters high. For our numerical experiment, we placed the
access point (AP) in the hallway at [45.6, 6.2, 3.0] m. For the
positions of transmitters, we considered a 12 m × 67 m area,
shown as outlined with a dashed line in the figure. We assumed
all transmitters are at a height of 2 m, being anywhere on a
uniform horizontal grid of 405 points with 1.5-meter spacing.
We randomly chose 2 points within the 12 m × 67 m
area as the legal and spoofing nodes. For each scenario, (1)
WiSE was used to generate channel impulse responses for
the 2 nodes; and (2) the hypothesis test described above was
used to compute β, for given α, by Eq. (14). We repeated the
experiment 405 × 404/2 = 81810 times, and computed the
average miss rate, for each system configuration.
B. Simulation Results
In the simulations, we consider MIMO, single-input
multiple-output (SIMO), multiple-input single-output (MISO),
and single-input single-output (SISO) systems, with seperation
of two neighboring antennas of 3 cm (i.e., half wavelength),
α = 0.01, f0 = 5 GHz, NF = 10, b = 0.25 MHz, and
PT ∈ {0.1, 1, 10} mW, if not specified otherwise. The per
tone SNR ranges from -16.5 dB to 53.6 dB, with a median
value of 16 dB, using transmit power per tone PT = 0.1 mW,
b = 0.25 MHz, and NT = NR = 1.
Figure 3 shows that the average miss rate decreases with
the frequency sample size, M , with W = 20 MHz, indicating
that we should use all of the channel estimation data and set
M = Ms. In addition, it can be seen that the security gain of
MIMO, defined by Eq. (15), decreases with M , when PT >
467 m
1.5 m
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Fig. 2. System topology assumed in the simulations. The receiver is located
at [45.6, 6.2, 3.0] m in a 120 m × 14 m × 4 m office building. The antenna
distance is half wavelength (3 cm). All transmitters, including both legal
transmitters and spoofing nodes, are located on dense grids at a height of
2 m. The total number of samples in the grids is 405.
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Fig. 3. Average miss rate of spoofing detection in wideband systems, in
SISO, 2×1 MISO, 1×2 SIMO, and 2×2 MIMO systems, respectively, with
α = 0.01, M = 5, b = 0.25 MHz, W = 20 MHz, and PT ∈ {0.1, 1, 10}
mW.
0.1 mW. For instance, G(PT = 1 mW,M = 1) = (0.09 −
0.01)/0.01 = 8, is greater than G(PT = 1 mW,M = 10) =
1.7. If using high power and small M (e.g., M = 1), the SISO
system has accurate but insufficient channel response samples.
Thus the additional dimensions of channel samples in MIMO
systems allow for much better performance. On the contrary, if
using high PT and large M , the performance of SISO systems
is too good to be significantly improved.
We can also see that the security gain slightly rises with M ,
when PT is as low as 0.1 mW, e.g., G(PT = 0.1 mW,M =
1) < G(PT = 0.1 mW,M = 10). This observation arises,
because when the channel estimation is not accurate due to
low SNR, the systems need much more data to make a right
decision.
Similarly, the impact of PT on the MIMO security gain
also depends on the value of M : The gain rises with PT ,
under small M , e.g., G(PT = 10 mW,M = 1) > G(PT =
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Fig. 4. Average miss rate of spoofing detection for various configuration of
NT and NR, with α = 0.01, M = 3, PT ∈ {0.1, 1} mW, b = 0.25 MHz,
and W = 2 MHz.
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Fig. 5. Average miss rate of spoofing detection in wideband systems, given
false alarm rate of 0.01, in SISO, 2 × 1 MISO, 1 × 2 SIMO, and 2 × 2
MIMO systems, respectively, with α = 0.01, M = 4, b = 0.25 MHz, and
PT ∈ {0.1, 1, 10} mW.
0.1 mW,M = 1). Otherwise, under large M , the security
gain decreases with PT , e.g., G(PT = 10 mW,M = 10) <
G(PT = 0.1 mW,M = 10).
Next, Fig. 4 indicates that the miss rate decreases with NR,
and the security gain of NR decreases with NR. On the other
hand, the impact of multiple (NT ) transmit antennas on the au-
thentication performance is determined by parameters like PT ,
M , and NR, since the use of more transmit antennas reduces
the transmit power per antenna, while providing additional
channel estimation samples. For instance, with PT = {0.1
mW, 1 mW} and M = 3, the miss rate decreases with NT ,
under NR = 1, while it rises with NT , under NR > 1.
As discussed in Section III-C, Fig. 5 shows that the miss
5100 101 102
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Measurement Noise Bandwidth, b (kHz)
A
ve
ra
ge
 M
iss
 R
at
e
 
 
SISO
MISO
SIMO
MIMO
Fig. 6. Average miss rate of spoofing detection in narrowband systems, given
false alarm rate of 0.01, in SISO, 2×1 MISO, 1×2 SIMO, and 2×2 MIMO
systems, respectively, with α = 0.01, M = 1, PT = 0.1 mW, and b = W .
rate decreases with system bandwidth, W , since the M = 4
channel samples are less correlated with wider bandwidth. On
the other hand, the MIMO security gain decreases with W ,
as the miss rate in SISO systems decreases more rapidly with
W than that in MIMO systems. It is also shown that SIMO is
better than MIMO, under large W .
Finally, the detection performance in narrowband systems
is presented in Fig. 6, with b ranging between 250 Hz and 250
kHz. Since a larger noise bandwidth decreases SNR, it raises
the miss rate and reduces the MIMO security gain.
V. SUMMARIES & DISCUSSION
We have proposed a MIMO-assisted channel-based authen-
tication scheme, exploiting the spatial decorrelation property
of the wireless medium to detect spoofing attacks. We pre-
sented the average miss detection rate, for a given false alarm
rate of 0.01, and evaluated the security gain (defined as the
improvement in authentication performance over SISO sys-
tems, Eq. (15)) for different MIMO transmission parameters.
We had the following observations:
• The MIMO security gain decreases with the system band-
width (W ), because the SISO system provides sufficient
decorrelation at high bandwidth, making resolution of
Alice and Eve better.
• The MIMO security gain decreases with the noise band-
width (b) in narrowband systems, since the noise power is
larger there by affecting the estimation of MIMO channel
parameters.
• The MIMO security gain decreases with the frequency
sample size (M ), if the transmit power (PT ) is as large as
1 mW. If using high power and small M , the SISO system
has accurate but insufficient channel response samples.
Thus the additional dimensions of channel samples in
MIMO systems allow for much better performance. On
the contrary, if using high PT and large M , the perfor-
mance of SISO systems is too good to be significantly
improved.
On the other hand, the MIMO security gain slightly rises
with M , if PT is as small as 0.1 mW. This is because
when the channel estimation is not accurate due to low
SNR, the systems need much more data to make a right
decision.
• Similarly, the MIMO security gain rises with PT , under
small M (e.g., M = 1). Otherwise, it decreases with PT ,
under large M (e.g., M = 10).
We can also compare the security gain with the MIMO
diversity gain, as a function of the number of transmit and
receive antennas. It is well known that the diversity gain rises
with both the number of transmit antennas and the number of
receive antennas. We have found that
• The use of multiple (i.e., NR > 1) receive antennas
improves the detection of spoofing attacks. This is a
case where both the security gain and the diversity gain
increase due to additional receive antennas.
• On the other hand, the security gain by using multiple
(i.e., NT > 1) transmit antennas may be positive or
negative, based on the value of PT , M , and NR, since
the transmit power per antenna decreases with NT , while
more transmit antennas provide extra channel estimation
samples. This is a case where the security gain sometimes
decreases but the diversity gain always rises due to
additional transmit antennas.
Thus the MIMO-assisted channel-based authentication
schemes provide a wide range of parameter choices and
performance tradeoffs that have to be considered in the context
of both security gains and MIMO performance gains.
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